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more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically.
When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of
them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative state-
ments. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as
he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on
equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to
the obligations set forth in Sec. 11336.
ANNA FAYE BLACKBURN
REAL PROPERTY
ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY FEES IN STATUTORY PARTITION
Plaintiff sought to partition a piece of land which was subject to a
mortgage. The mortgagee consented to come into the partition proceed-
ings. Even though the proceeds of the partition sale were insufficient to
cover the mortgage indebtedness, the Court of Appeals for Hamilton
County gave plaintiff's attorney priority in his claim for a fee over the
mortgagee. Klosterman v. Klosterman, 58 Ohio Ap. 511, 16 N.E.
(2d) 826 (1938).
The decision was made on the authority of Ohio G. C. section
12,050, "Having regard to the interest of the parties, the benefit each
may derive from a partition, and according to equity, the court shall tax
the costs and expenses which accrue in the action including reasonable
counsel fees, which must be paid to plaintiff's counsel unless the court
awards some part thereof to other counsel for service in the case for the
common benefit of all the parties, and execution may issue therefore as
in other cases."
There are several other statutes in Ohio allowing attorney fees to
be assessed as costs: in taxpayer's suits for the recovery of misappropriated
funds, Gen. Code sec. 2923; in suits by municipalities for appropriation
of land (allowance to defendant's attorney if land is not taken or money
paid over within six months after the decree) Gen. Code sec. 3697; in
suits for the collection of sanitary district assessments, Gen. Code sec.
6602-85; in land owner's suits for costs of erecting a fence for a rail-
road, Gen. Code sec. 8915; in appeals from justice courts to the com-
mon pleas court when there is a failure to substantially better appellant's
judgment, Gen. Code sec. 10,356; in appeals from the court of appeals
to the Supreme Court where there is no reasonable cause for appeal,
Gen. Code sec. 12,223-36; in proceedings by one holding a mechanic's
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lien where more than one lien claimant will benefit, Gen. Code sec.
8323; and in proceedings to perpetuate testimony where an attorney is
appointed by the court to represent one of the parties, Gen. Code sec.
12,219. Fees are also allowed as costs in administration and receivership
cases and the like: Gen. Code secs. 10,509-193, 10,51o-io and
10,511-25. Sometimes attorneys' fees are allowed as part of exemplary
damages. Iron Co. v. Harper, 41 Ohio St. IOO (1884).
The theory behind most of these allowances seems to be that the
plaintiff has been compelled to take the initiative or is acting in a semi-
administrative or semi-judicial capacity or that there is a penalty for
malice, unjustifiable appeal, or the like. The theory of the Ohio Par-
tition Statute and of nearly all the decisions allowing counsel fees in
partition involves considerations of mutual benefit to all the parties
arising from the initiative of the plaintiff and his payment of many of
the formal procedural expenses.
In the instant case it is difficult to see just how the mortgagee was
benefited by the services of the plaintiff's counsel. The effect of levying
the fees as costs against the property amounts in this case to compelling
the intervening mortgagee to pay them all. Did not the plaintiff assume
some risk that the property would not cover the mortgage indebtedness?
There is no showing in the opinion that the mortgagee got any more
clear title by virtue of the suit or acquired any other benefit.
Although not mentioned in the principal case, the Court of Appeals
for Warren County in a similar case denied the right of the plaintiff's
attorney to have fees allowed when the mortgagee purchased the prop-
erty in partition. Columbus Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Den-
null, 21 Ohio App. 363, 153 N.E. 133 (1926). In this case it was
emphasized that the mortgagee paid appraiser's fees, costs of advertising
and sale, and ordinary court costs. While it does not appear that the
mortgagee paid these items in the instant case, the opinion does not make
that the ratio decidendi, or even mention the fact. It is hard to see any
valid basis of distinction on the grounds that where the mortgagee buys
the property theke is never any fund paid into the hands of the court to
be distributed. Neither distinction seems valid and the courts in these
two cases seem to have started with different assumptions as to the scope
and purpose of Gen. Code sec. 12,050. In each case, by answering, the
mortgagee consented that the property be sold free from the lien but
expected that the proceeds from the sale would be applied first to its
payment. Although a mortgagee is not a necessary party to a partition
action in Ohio as he is in some states, Marx v. State Bank of Chicago,
294 Ill. 568, 128 N.E. 475 (192o), yet it does not seem just that he
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should be penalized for volunteering to consolidate litigation. In the
Illinois case just cited the mortgagee paid the other costs but did not pay
the fee of the plaintiff's attorney.
The principal case is in accord with the tendency of the majority
of the states to be quite liberal in allowing the fees where there is a
statute permitting it. While it is often spoken of as a matter of reversible
judicial discretion, the allowance of the trial court is usually affirmed.
Mathews v. Lytle, 220 Ala. 78, 124 So. 197 (1929); Randell v.
Randell, 4 Cal. (2d) 575, 50 Pac. (2d) 8o6 (1935); Jennings v. Jen-
nungs, 225 Mo. App. 1010, 33 S.W. (2d) 165 (193); Fibbe v.
Poland, 24 Ohio App. 532, 157 N.E. 8o8 (1927); Watkins v. Mer-
riheW, 102 Vt. 190, 147 A. 345 (1929). But an allowance of fees
has been refused on the grounds that defendant is entitled to be repre-
sented by counsel of his own choice. Brown v. Rosenbaum and Little,
125 Miss. 87, 87 So. 130 (1921); Lewis v. Crawford, 175 Ark 1012,
I S.W. (2d) 26 (1928); 73 A.L.R. 24. And while the general rule
seems to be that the interposition of a substantial defense in good faith
precludes the allowance of attorney fees (73 A.L.R. 22), Ohio is ap-
parently in the minority in allowing the fee regardless of the type of
defense. Lowe v. Phillips, 21 Ohio St. 657 (1871). In Young v.
Stone, 55 Ohio St. 125, 45 N.E. 57 (1893), however, we find a pro-
nouncement that the services must be for the common benefit of all.
That case denied the assessment of fees against the property of those
whose title would have been affected if the adverse claim had been sfuc-
cessful because the litigation did not "benefit or affect" the persons
entitled to one-half the ancestral estate in controversy.
While the Ohio Statute has been classed as mandatory in form (73
A.L.R. 35), it differs very little from the statute in Illinois which pro-
vides that each party shall pay his equitable portion of the fee which was
construed in McMullen v. Reynolds, 209 Ill- 504, 70 N.E. 1041
(1904) reversing 105 Ill. App. 386 (903), as not requiring apportion-
ment in cases where that would be inequitable or would work a hard-
ship on defendant who must of necessity employ counsel to adequately
protect his interests. Illinois has held that allowance of fees 'could not
be sustained without evidence in the record showing what services were
performed and the value thereof.
It is frequently stated that statutes in derogation of the common law
should be strictly construed. Statutory authority of some sort seems to
be a prerequisite to the taxation of any counsel fees in partition cases
(73 A.L.R. 17). Inasmuch as the partition statute is the only basis for
the claim of the plaintiff's attorney, in a partition action for an allowance
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of fees out of the proceeds of the sale, there would seem to be adequate
grounds for denying him a priority over an intervening mortgagee's
interest. There would also seem to be ample authority for such a holding
on the basis of Young v. Stone, supra. In that case the assessment of
the fees against the property of those who might have received some
tenuous benefit was denied because all the parties did not benefit. Al-
though there was a definite contract for compensation, the court said
that the fact that the service was not for the "common benefit of all"
was equally decisive of the case. In Klosterman v. Klosternm there was
no apparent benefit to the other defendants nor to the mortgagee.
A zealous attorney can usually find a speculative or theoretical
benefit on which to base the allowance of fees when the allowance tends
to be made on the basis of custom and inertia without a strict examina-
tion of the merits of the claim. The general rule in other proceedings in
this country is to have each party pay his own attorney. If the question
of benefit is put in issue it would seem reasonable to make the plaintiff's
attorney bear the usual burden of proof as to the existence and amount
of benefit conferred on the defendant.
ARTHUR N. MINDLING
SALES
TRANSFER OF TITLE TO AUTOMOBILES UNDER NEW CERTIFI-
CATE OF TITLE ACT
The Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. The City Loan & Savings
Go. v. Taggart, Recorder, 134 Ohio St. 374, 17 N.E. (2d) 758, de-
cided November 16, 1938, upheld the constitutionality and validity of
sections 6290-2 to 6290-17 of the General Code enacted in 1937 which
repealed code sections 6310-3 to 6310-14 relating to motor vehicles
and requiring a bill of sale to be executed in accordance with the pro-
visions of the act which imposed a penalty in case of failure to comply.
The new Certificate of Title ict provides that tide to all motor vehicles
owned and operated in Ohio be represented by certificates of title. Code
section 6290-2 provides that "no manufacturer, importer, dealer, or
other person shall sell or otherwise dispose of a new motor vehicle to a
dealer to be used by such dealer for purposes of display and resale with-
out delivering to such dealer a manufacturer's or importer's certificate
duly executed in accordance [with the act] and with such assignments
thereon as may be necessary to show tide in the purchaser thereof; nor
shall such dealer purchase or acquire a new motor vehicle without obtain-
